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There is no need for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership agreement to include investor-state arbitration
The U.S and the European Union are about to begin the latest round of negotiations towards
the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Many argue that the agreement
could have considerable economic and political benefits on both sides of the Atlantic.
Controversy has erupted, however, over plans to include investment protections provisions
typically used in agreements with developing countries. The House of Lords yesterday
released its recommendations to the British government about the agreement. It is largely
sympathetic to including investor-state arbitration in the agreement, but only on one condition.
Lauge Poulsen, who gave evidence to the House of Lords’ hearing process, reflects on the
report. 
Should it be up to three private arbitration lawyers to determine whether the Brit ish government should pay
compensation to American investors f or public regulation? Should Brit ish investors dissatisf ied with f ederal
or state level regulations in the United States be allowed to avoid American courtrooms? The UK’s House
of  Lords thinks so. That was the message in a report issued yesterday about the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership, which is currently under negotiation.
But there is a caveat. The most passionate proponent who appeared bef ore the House of  Lords sub-
committee was a representative of  the arbitration community. Although the report shares some of  his
views, it goes on to say that proponents of  investment arbitration have “yet to make a compelling case.” 
Even if  the American government agrees to water down its provisions f rom previous investment treaties,
proponents still need to provide “evidence that the UK could attract more investment from the US by signing
up to such provisions.” As I noted during the hearing process and discuss below, no such evidence seems to
exist. But f irst some background.
Thousands of  investment treaties already allow f oreign investors to f ile claims against sovereign
governments in f ront of  international tribunals. As a result, governments around the world have f ound
themselves subject to of ten f ar-reaching international arbitration claims about their environmental
regulation, public health regulation, f inancial services provision, and other areas of  sensit ive government
intervention.
Most claims are against developing countries. But in recent years, developed countries have been sued as
well. Phillip Morris has f iled a claim against Australia f or its plain packaging regulation based on the Hong-
Kong Australia investment treaty. Whereas Australian courts init ially dismissed the claim, private arbitrators
now get a chance to second-guess the decision – this t ime based on separate treaty rights rather than
Australian law. As a result of  the claim, New Zealand decided to postpone plain packaging regulation.
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Swedish energy giant, Vattenf all, has f iled two suits against the German government based on the Energy
Charter Treaty. The f irst claim was settled by allowing Vattenf all to proceed with operating a coal- f ired
power plant based on less stringent environmental requirements than intended by the German authorit ies.
In the second claim Vattenf all is asking f or about €700 million in compensation f or Merkel’s decision to
phase out nuclear power.
Canadian and American governments have been subject to numerous investor claims based on the North
American Free Trade Agreement. In one claim against Canada, the settlement involved compensation of  $16
million to an American investor along with a retraction of  the environmental measure targeted in the
dispute. These may be exceptional cases, yet they illustrate the breadth of  the system and its ability to
result in liability even f or countries widely considered as business-f riendly and well-governed.
Not surprisingly, the regime has attracted its f air share of  crit ics. Questions arise whether arbitral tribunals,
which typically consist of  corporate lawyers, should have authority to rule on f undamental areas of  public
regulation. Even staunch supporters of  f ree trade have questioned the prudence of  providing f oreign
investors greater rights than domestic investors. Unlike the global trade regime, which is based on non-
discrimination, investment treaties provide posit ive discrimination to already powerf ul multinationals and
other international investors. This is more than dif f icult to justif y on economic terms.
But at least proponents of  investment arbitration have had a plausible justif ication f or investment treaties
signed between developed and developing countries: f oreign investors occasionally need an independent
f orum to settle disputes with host governments, and in some corners of  the world domestic courts are not
up f or the task. Few f oreign investors would expect a f air hearing in local courts in Z imbabwe. No one
would be willing to invest hundreds of  millions of  dollars in a Russian gas f ield if  the only recourse to settle
disputes with Putin were Russian courts. In such cases, some f orm of  international recourse can be
sensible.
But while courts in Western Europe and the United States may not always be perf ect, they do not suf f er
f rom lack of  independence and polit ical interf erence. So why displace them with ad hoc arbitration panels
consisting of  private lawyers with no real opportunit ies f or appeal? Although the risk that developed
countries lose investment treaty disputes may not be large, why run it in the f irst place?
In Washington, it seems, concerns exist about the investment climate in poorer members of  the EU. Yet the
United States already has bilateral investment treaties with most Eastern European member states and
American investors can always be encouraged to take up an insurance against polit ical risks or negotiate
individual contracts allowing f or international arbitration.
In Europe, some of f icials realize investment arbitration is unnecessary in a transatlantic deal but believe it
is important as precedent f or f uture negotiations with China. Yet, Beijing has been one of  the staunchest
promoters of  investment treaties in recent years to protect outward Chinese investments. So it is hard to
promoters of  investment treaties in recent years to protect outward Chinese investments. So it is hard to
see why the investment climate in China justif ies giving American investors alternatives to European courts.
The same can be said about the argument that it is hypocrit ical to ask only developing countries f or
investment arbitration. The main justif ication f or investment arbitration has always been the need to
substitute f or dysf unctional domestic legal systems. The provisions in NAFTA, the North American f ree
trade agreement, were init ially intended f or f oreign investors operating in Mexico – not the United States or
Canada. The provisions in the Energy Charter Treaty were intended to provide added protections to
investments in Eastern Europe and Russia – not a country like Germany.
Investment treaties between developed countries remain rare. This is not surprising, as you need very
strong justif ications f or displacing tenured judges with private lawyers. In well-developed legal systems
such justif ications are not there, as there is no systematic discrimination against f oreigners. That is why
proponents of  investor-state arbitration have yet to provide a “compelling case” f or including investment
arbitration in the transatlantic agreement.
Instead, the House of  Lords is now calling f or strong economic arguments. Don’t hold your breath if  such
arguments don’t come anytime soon. American investment treaties have not even had a signif icant impact
on promoting investments into developing countries. American lawyers say the treaties are hardly ever
important f or investment decisions in practice.  Polit ical risk insurance providers say the treaties are very
rarely relevant f or the pricing of  investment risks. Even American negotiators themselves have tradit ionally
argued that American investment treaties are not going to have a signif icant impact on American outf low of
investment. This f ollows the general f inding that investment treaties are more than unlikely to promote
investment f lows, and when they do the ef f ect is very small. And again, this is f or countries with
questionable legal systems – not a country like the United Kingdom, which quite clearly should not expect
greater inf lows of  investment f rom signing an investment treaty.
The gains of  a f ree trade and investment area across the Atlantic do not depend on investor state
arbitration. When the United States and Australia negotiated an investment agreement they agreed to
exclude provisions f or investor-state arbitration. Washington was hesitant, but couldn’t argue against the
Australian posit ion that no American investor would f ind Australian courts inherently biased or subject to
polit ical involvement. Australia also recently entered into an investment treaty with Japan without recourse
to investor-state arbitration. Why not f ollow the same example in the transatlantic agreement? Why is it
necessary to give f oreign investors the right to evade European and American courts?
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